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of law and fact; otherwise, it would be appealed on questions of law."0
This historical interpretation has not been applied to the determination
of the right to a jury trial. Under Ohio G.C., Section 11379 all actions
for money only, or for the recovery of specific real or personal property
are entitled to a jury trial. The statute limits the right to a jury trial
to these specific instances whether historically legal or equitable, so that
some cases historically equitable may have a jury trial as of right. The
equitable counterclaim historically is an affirmative action in equity.
Now if the historical distinction does not apply to the right to a jury
trial, it may theoretically be that in some instances the defendant plead-
ing an equitable counterclaim may be entitled to a jury trial under the
statute. However, if we assume that the action is equitable and does
not fall within the classification of Ohio G.C. Section 11379, and the
plaintiff's action is one entitled to a jury, what effect does the counter-
claim have? In Buckner v. Mear1 it is said that even though the plain-
tiff's cause of action is triable by a jury, if the answer constitutes an
equitable cause of action which if established will extinguish or supersede
the plaintiff's cause of action, the new issues are triable to the court
and not as a matter of right to the jury. Thus, it may be said that an
equitable counterclaim, unless it falls within the requirements of Ohio
G.C. Section 11379, will not admit of a trial by jury as of right. It
is an independent action calling to it its own mode of trial.
In the principal case it would seem that the court was right in re-
quiring a jury trial. The plaintiff's action was one at law for money
only and entitled to a jury trial unless changed by an equitable counter-
claim in the defendant's answer. However, the answer in the principal
case was an equitable defense and could not, therefore, change the mode
of trial. Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial and it
was error to allow a trial to the court. F.A.R.
INSURANCE
INSURANCE - BANKRUPTCY - RIGHTS OF INJURED PARTY'
TO PROCEED AGAINST THE INSURER
Morris, Inc., an Ohio corporation engaged in the business of inter-
state hauling, carried liability insurance with the defendant company for
the benefit of shippers using its service. On February 25, 1936, mer-
chandise consigned to the plaintiff was destroyed in transit. Morris, Inc.
filed a petition in bankruptcy and was duly adjudged a bankrupt on
'Supra, notes 9 and 16; OHIo GENERAL CODE, Sec. 12223-I.
26 Ohio St. 54 (1875).
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December 14, 1936. Plaintiff applied to the bankruptcy court, and
was granted permission to bring suit against the trustee in bankruptcy
of Morris, Inc. Judgment being rendered on default against the
trustee, the plaintiff filed a supplemental petition under favor of G.C.
9510-4, made the insurance company a new party defendant, and
prayed judgment for the amount recovered in the original action against
the trustee. The company filed a demurrer which the trial court sus-
tained. An appeal being taken, the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County reversed the decision of the trial court,' and the cause reached
the Supreme Court upon a motion to certify. A majority of the high
court (three judges dissentng) held that an injured party, to reach
insurance money by filing a supplemental petiton under G.C. 9510-4,
must secure a judgment against the insured. The statute is in deroga-
tion of the common law, and must be strictly construed. d judgment
against the insured's trustee in bankruptcy does not meet the requirement
of the statute.2
In the absence of statute, an injured party acquires no rights under
a liability policy insuring the tort-feasor.3 The liability of the insurer
is usually contingent upon some loss, within the scope of the policy,
suffered by the assured. Unless the policy has an express provision
indicating an intent to benefit the injured person,4 or is so written that
such an intent may reasonably be inferred,' the insurance contract is
deemed to be for the sole benefit of the assured. Payment by the as-
sured is a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. "No action"
clauses may properly be incorporated into the contract, which provide
that no action will lie against the insurer prior to actual loss to the
assured. ' Thus, when the insured tort-feasor becomes insolvent or
unable to pay his debt the injured party's judgment against him is of
no avail. The judgment creditor gains no cause of action against the
insurer. The principle of subrogation does not operate in his favor,
because no right accrues to the assured prior to an actual payment. The
insolvency or bankruptcy of the assured relieves the insurer of his con-
' Gross Galesburg Co. v. The World Fire and Marine Ins. Co., et al, in the Court
of Appeals of Franklin County, Ohio, decision rendered on May io, 1939, docket
no. 2,95gs.
=Groos Galesburg Co., Appellee v. Ingalls, Jr., Trusteei The World Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., Appellant, 136 Ohio St. 45o (1940).
a VANCE ON INSURANCE, znd ed., s. 178; State Auto Ins. Co. v. Col. Mot. Exp.,
x Ohio L. Abs. 747 (1933)5 "One who suffers injuries which come within the provisions
of a liability insurance policy, is not in privity of contract with the insurer and cannot
reach the proceeds of the policy for the payment of his claim by an action against the
incurer, unless such recovery is permitted by statute or by the expressed provisions of the
policy."
'Slavens v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 Fed. (zd) 859 (1928).
"See Onso G.C., Sections 614-zx5.
'Goodman v. Georgia Life Insurance Co., 189 Ala. 13o, 66 So. 649 (i9x4).
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tingent liability under the policy, and the injured party obtains no benefit
therefrom.
7
Little has been done in the trend of court decisions to ameliorate
this condition. It has been held that the transfer of a debtor's assets
to a trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of his creditors (the injured
party beng a judgment creditor) constitutes a payment sufficient to
satisfy a policy wherein the insurer's liability is conditioned upon payment
by the assured.' A few courts, in the absence of statute, have allowed
a garnishment of the payment by the insurer.9 But the more common
view has been to deny to the injured party the benefits of this device."
The most significant changes, inuring to the benefit of persons
injured, have come about through legislation. Many of the statutes in
this area have been so written and construed as to become an integral
part of the liability insurance contract. They, in effect, subrogate the
injured person having an unsatisfied judgment against the assured to
the rights of the assured against the insurance company. Hence, the
liability of the insurer cannot be conditioned upon pre-payment, and
the injured person does not suffer (nor the insurer avoid liablity) by
the insolvency or the bankruptcy of the assured tort-feasor." Some
states have gone so far as to provide that the injured party may join
the insurance company in the original action.'" Legislation in this area
has been impelled, in large part, by the increased volume of liability in-
surance litigation resulting from the growing number of highway
mishaps. 3
The Ohio statute, invoked by the plaintiff in the principal case, is
similar in character to the subrogation statutes described above. The
term "subrogation," however, does not appear in its clauses.' 4 The
present Ohio statutes, relevant to this problem, evolved from early laws
enacted to benefit employees who had received injuries in the course
of their employment. Prior to 1914, employers were subject to com-
"Hollings v. Brown, 2oz Ala. 504, 80 So. 79z (192z).
'Travelers Ins. Co. v. Moses, 63 N.J.Eq. z6o, 49 A. 720, 9z Am. St. Rep. 663
(i9os).
9 Patterson v. Adan, sii Minn. 308, 138 N.W. zSI, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 184 (19sz)
" Allen v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 145 Fed. 381. 76 C.C.A. z6S, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 95S
(i9o6).
a'Stacey v. Fid. & Cas. Co., zi Ohio App. 70, 35z N.E. 794. (spz9), af'd, 114-
Ohio St. 633, 151 N.E. 718 (xgz6): "The present effect of the statutes is to subrogate
the injured person, who obtains a judgment against the insured, to the rights of the
insured, and to the insurance money to which he is then entitled."
'Wis. Stat. 92z7, s. 85.25.
x BENOY'S OHIO INSURANCE AND NEG.LIGENCE LAW, 1936, s. 577-
14 Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co. v. Randall, szS Ohio St. 581, 183 N.E. 433,
(193z): "The word subrogation doesn't appear in 95io-4, but it clearly involves the prin-
ciple of subrogation, and it is therefore made a part of every liability insurance policy
in Ohio, where claims is for personal injury or death."
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mon law actions for such injuries. While the common law rule ob-
tained, an employee recovering against his employer for injuries sus-
tained in an industrial accident had no right against the insurance com-
pany." In I9IO, the legislature passed "An Act Relative to Employers'
Liability Risks" which-in effect-prohibited policy provisions releasing
the insurance company in the event of the insolvency of the insured."
The act was amended in 1919, and the principle was extended in favor
of persons injured by any "person, firm or corporation" carrying lia-
bilty insurance." The benefits of this amendment were limited to
persons suffering bodily injury through the negligence of the assured.
They did not extend to persons attempting to recover under policies
insuring against liability for damage to property; 8 nor did they favor a
husband suing to recover damages for the loss of the services of his wife."
The recent amendment (invoked by the plaintiff in the principal
case) gave the law is present scope; it is now calculated to benefit per-
sons who have recovered a final judgment against the insured "firm,
person or corporation . . . for loss or damages on account of bodily
injury or death, for loss or damage to tangible or intangible property
of any person, firm or corporation, for loss or damage to a person on
account of bodily injury to his wife, minor child or children ... .
The significant effect of the statute is that the liability of the insurer
exists prior to and independent of any actual payment by the assured,
regardless of provisions in the policy to the contrary. 2 Although the
statute gives the injured person a right to recover against the insurer
(where none exdsted under the common law), his rights are not greater
than those of the policy holder.2" The insurer is made liable only within
the terms of the insurance contract, and such liability is extended only
by the fact that it may no longer be made contingent upon the actual
'Garrett v. Travelers Ins. Co., 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 41z, 2o Ohio Dec. 1S (i9o9):
"An injured employee of the insured, who has recovered a judgment against his employer,
can not maintain an action on policy of employer's liability insurance against the insur-
ance company, because (z) the obligations of the policy do not extend beyond the two
contracting parties, (z) there is no jural relation between the injured employee and the
insurance company, (3) the undertaking of the company is only to indemnify for loss
actually sustained by satisfaction of judgment."
" Ono G.C. sec. 951o-Is io Ohio Laws 191, 19z (191o)i see also 95io-z.
'7Ouzo G.C. sec. 95Io-35 soS Ohio Laws 385, pt. I, s. 1 (1919).
' State Auto Mut. v. Col. Mot. Exp., supra, note 3.
"New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Nadler, ii5 Ohio St. 47z, 154 N.E. 736 (933);
Klein v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., i9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 4z6, afl'd, 9 Ohio App.
241, 29 Ohio C.A. 175 (1917).2
"Onio G.C., sec. 95io-4 as amended in xi5 Ohio Laws 4o3, s. 1.
"Verducci v. Cas. Co. of Am., 96 Ohio St. z6o, 117 N.E. z35 (1917); Steinback
v. Maryland Cas. Co., z5 Ohio App. 392 (1921).
'Rohlf v. Great Am. Mut. Indem. Co., Z7 Ohio App. zoS, 16x N.E. 232 (9M7).
payment by the assured.23 A concise and inclusive exposition of the
effect of G.C. 9510-4 may be found in the opinion of the Ohio Supreme
Court in the case of Stacey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co.,24 where it
held by virtue of G.C. 951o-4 a judgment creditor is entitled to
a direct action against the insurer after obtaining a judgment against the
insured, and 3o days after judgment is rendered, provided that any
conditions of the policy as to notice which would be binding upon the
assured have been met. Clearly, the statute creates no cause of action
against the insurer until the injured party's claim against the assured
has been reduced to judgment.25 As this statute, relied upon by the
plaintiff in the instant case, created rights which were not existent under
the common law, by the ordinary rules of construction, it must be read
strictly. The principal ground for the majority view lies in the fact
that the injured plaintiff did not satisfactorily comply wth the statutory
requirement by first taking judgment against the assured company.
Judgment was against the insured company's trustee in bankruptcy.
This, said the court, did not satisfy the conditions of the statute, and an
action relying thereon must fail.
The three dissenting judges have not supported their position -with
an opinion. However, the holding of the Court of Appeals for Franklin
County favored the plaintiff and may be profitably examined." The
lower appellate court held that the distinction between a judgment
against the insured party and a judgment against his trustee in bank-
ruptcy was purely technical; that under Section 63b of the Bankruptcy
Act (now sec. 57 d of the Chandler Act) the bankruptcy court was
given power, pursuant to a proper application by the claimant, to
liquidate contingent claims in such a manner as it might see fit; and that
statutory conditions respecting judgments as conditions precedent to
action against third parties (i.e., shareholders) might be waived if per-
formance were in some manner impossible or impracticable. The court
leans heavily upon Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Agnew, with
respect to the latter proposition.2" In the Firestone case, they brought suit
'Stacey v. Fid. & Cas. Co., supra, note ii: "The party injured can't recover under
G.C. 953o-3, or 953o-4 where the insured party failed to notify the insurer of the acci-
dent as required by the policy."
See also, U.S. Casualty Co. v. Breese, 22 Ohio App. 522, 153 N.E. 2o6 (i9z5),
where the insured failed to notify the insurer as required by the policy.
But in Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Randall, supra, note 14, it was held that
G.C. 95so-4. "invests the injured person with such beneficial interest as entitles him
to give notice of suit as required of the insured by the policy, and this independent of the
knowledge or consent of the insured."
' Stacey v. Fidelty and Casualty Co., supra, note as.
mSteinbach v. Maryland Cas Co., i5 Ohio App. 392 (sgzs).
'Supra, note i.
'June Z2, 1938, 5z Stat. 866, c. 575i ii U.S.C.A. 93.
'3Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Agnew, 86 N.E. i16, 294 N. Y. 165, z4.L.R.A. (N.S.) 628, z6 Ann. Cas. i51o (ipog).
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against certain shareholders to enforce liability for unpaid stock purchases.
A New York statute had been enacted to limit creditors' rights against
shareholders by making a judgment against the corporation (returned
unsatisfied) a condition precedent to recovery, and by placing a two-
year limitation upon the bringing of suits. The court said, in effect,
that when such limits imposed by statute become impossible to perform-
or if performance were a mere gesture-they might be dispensed
with to the extent that the allowance of a claim by the bankruptcy
court would satisfy the requirement of a final judgment. Here was
not a right created by the statute under construction, but one limiting
an existing right. The court chose to apply a liberal construction.
If, in the instant case, it might be validly contended that the bankruptcy
of the assured made performance of the statutory condition (namely a
judgment against the bankrupt) impossible or impracticable of per-
formance, a more liberal construction of the statute (G.C. 9510-4)
could be defended on the ground that such construction was necessary
to give effect to the intent of the legislature to benefit the party
suffering injury. However, an examination of some of the cases involv-
ing similar problems impels the belief that the plaintiff herein could
have met the provisions of the statute by following a well-established
practice. Specifically, he could have brought his action against the
assured bankrupt, after the adjudication, reduced his claim to a final
judgment against the assured, and filed a completely valid supplemental
petition against the insurer.
The filing of a petition in bankruptcy does not preclude the com-
mencement of an action against the bankrupt;29 nor does an actual
adjudication have the effect of preventing the commencement of such
suit."° An adjudication does not have the effect of ousting the state
courts of their jurisdiction over suits against the bankrupt.3 In fact,
the opinion of one federal court respecting an application of a plaintiff
for permission to sue the bankrupt in a state court is persuasive to the
view that federal courts have no power to grant such permission, or
'In Woods v. Berry, 296 P. 332, II Cal. App. 675 (193), the liability of the
bankrupt's co-defendant depended primarily upon the liability of the bankrupt.
The defendant contended that the fact of filing precluded the initiation of a
new action against the bankrupt. It was held that the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
does not prevent commencement of an action against the bankrupt5 the proper procedure
being for the adverse party to ask for a stay-the granting of which is within the wise
discretion of the bankruptcy court.
See also, Perkins v. ist Nat'l Bank, S6 P. (zd) 639, 47 Ariz. 376 (2936); Kantola
v. Hendrickson, z2 P. (zd) 866, Sz Idaho 217 (1932)i COLLIR ou BANmRVPTcY,
13 ed., 19z3, Vol. I, p. 693.S'Thompson v. Hill, 129 So. 3ZO, 152 Miss. 390 (2929); Contra, Bank of Rothville
v. Zaleuke, z95 S.W. 5zo, zz Mo. App. oS (19z7).
'Brazil v. Azevedo, x6z P. 2049, 32 Cal. App. 364 (1916).
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that such a permit would be of no legal efficacy where no order re-
straining such suits has previously issued. Commenting in In Re Natow
Bros.2 one federal court held that, "This court has not enjoined peti-
tioner from bringing such suit in any such court on this, or any other,
claim . . . Upon what basis or on what theory such an order could
be issued, or, if issued, would be of any legal force and effect, it is diffi-
cult to understand." It is evident that the filing of a petition and the
consequent adjudication of the assured in the principal case did not
operate automatically to prevent an action by this plaintiff against
him. It seems unnecessary that he should have applied to the court
at all. In any event, he should not have applied for permission to move
against the trustee. He had no valid cause of action against the trustee
for the negligence of the bankrupt, or the negligent breach of the
contract to carry safely."3
The bankruptcy court has the power, under Section 5 7 d of the
Chandler Act,34 (formerly Section 63b of the Bankruptcy Act of 18 98)
to liquidate contingent and unliquidated claims. If the claim against
the bankrupt in the instant case be viewed as an unliquidated tort claim,
it was not provable against the estate for the reason that it was not
pending when the petition in bankruptcy was filed.3" Under this hy-
pothesis, the court's permission to the plaintiff to sue the trustee appears
improper, because it is difficult to see how the bankruptcy court could
be vested with jurisdiction over a non-provable claim within the meaning
of 57 d. However, the claim of the plaintiff was also grounded on a
negligent breach of a contract to carry-safely, and as such it would be
provable against the estate under Section 63a (4) of the Chandler
Act.8 The bankruptcy court would have the power (under Section
57d of the Chandler Act) to liquidate such a claim. It does not follow
that it became the duty (or even the prerogative) of the court to advise
the plaintiff that his default judgment against the trustee would be
useless.
While it is well-established that the filing of a suit against a bank-
rupt is not automatically precluded by adjudication, it is equally true
that the bankruptcy court, upon proper application by the bankrupt or
other party in interest, has power to stay such suit pending discharge of
the bankrupt.37 This power does not extend to suits brought in good
'Ils Re Natow Bros., 283 Fed. 522, 49 A.B.R. 245 (D. C. zgzz).
' In Re Helm Milk Prod. Co., 183 Fed. 787 (D.C. 393o).
"Supra, note 27.
'June 22, 1938, 5z Stat. 873, ch. 57S, s.x (s. 63)5 1i U.S.C.A. 103.
"
5Supra, note 35; Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U.S. 273, 51 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390, 75 L. Ed.
3o28 (3930).
sJune 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 849, ch. 575, $. (S.ii)5 ii U.S.C.A. 29.
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faith against the bankrupt upon claims which are not released by a dis-
chargeY The power to stay proceedings against the bankrupt exists
only in the case of dischargable debts.3" The power to stay is not man-
datory, " and it must be exercised-in the case of dischargable claims-
in the use of the court's wise discretion. The federal courts have limited
themselves in the exercise of this discretionary power. The general
criterion was enunciated in the leading case of Foust v. Munson S. S.
Lines, where the court held that the bankruptcy court should not stay
proceedings against the bankrupt unless such proceedings would hinder,
delay or embarrass the administration of the estate.4 ' In using this
discretionary power the courts have evolved a rather clear principle
respecting claims in the area of the principal case. Where a creditor
brings action against the bankrupt for the purpose of reducing his claim
to a judgment as a condition precedent to an action to enforce the lia-
bility of a third party (i.e., a surety on a bond conditioned upon a final
judgment against the principal), a stay of such proceedings has been
held to be an abuse of discretion.4 2 In Mack v. Pacific S. S. Lines,
Ltd.,- an employee who had a personal injury claim against a corporate
debtor undergoing reorganization under 7 7b, was held to be entitled
to a modificadon of a restraining order so that he might reduce his
claim to judgment and move against the insurer. The extent of this
willingness to allow claimants to proceed against the bankrupt is well
phrased in Remington on Bankruptcy, Section 1974: "It is proper for
the bankruptcy court to stay proceedings for a discharge, and to refuse
to stay a suit against the bankrupt, in order to permit a qualified judg-
ment to be taken where the obtaining of such judgment, or the taking
of other steps, is necessary in order to perfect the creditor's rights against
a third party, surety or guarantor.44
In view of this tendency, clearly embracing the circumstances of
the principal case, it appears that no impossibility of performance existed
'In Re Lawrence, x63 Fed. 131, io A.B.R. 698 (D.C. xgo8); COLLIER ON
BA'1RUPTCY, 13 th ed., 1923, VOl. I, p. 413.
"Holmes v. Davidson, 84 Fed. (2d) III (C.C.A. 1936).
"Connell v. Walker, zg U.S. 1, 54 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257, 78 L.Ed. 613 (1934).
', Fouot v. Munson S.S. Lines, 299 U.S. 77, 3x L. Ed. 49, 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90,
295 U.S. 649 (1936), undur 7 7 b. Followed in: First Nat'l Bank of Wellston v. Conway
Board Eotate3 Co., 94 Fed. (2d) 736 (C.C.A. 1938), under 7 7b5 Mack v. Pacific S.S.
Lines, Ltd., 94 Fed. (2d) 95 (C.C.A. 1938), under 77 b; In Re B.M.O. Corp., 24 Fed.
Supp. 6gz (D.C. x938), power to stay validity exercised under 77b.
"-'In Re Mercedes Import Co., x66 Fed. 427, 21 A.B.R. 59o (C.C.A. x9o8); In Re
Roounthal, ioS Fed. 358 (D.C. 9ox); Roebling's Sons Co. of N. Y. v. Federal Storage
Battery Co., 173 N.Y. Supp.. 297, 185 App. Div. 430 (1918).
"aMack v. Pacific S.S. Lines, Ltd., supra, note 41.
"Brown v. Four-in-One Coal Co., 286 Fed. S12, 2 A.B.R. (N.S.) 569, (C.C.A.
1923)i In Re Rosenstein, 276 Fed. 704, 47 A.B.R. 339 (C.C.A. 1921)i In Re Remington
Auto & Motor Co., x66 Fed. 427, z2 A.B.R. 59o (C.C.A.N.Y., reversing zo A.B.R. 648).
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with respect to compliance with the Ohio statute. The plaintiff need
only have elected a proper and available remedy by bringing his action
against the bankrupt, reducing his claim to judgment, and filing against
the insurer thereafter. R.M.A.
LABOR LAW
LIMITATION ON DEFINITION OF A TRADE DISPUTE-
PICKETING AS AN EXERCISE OF FREE SPEECH
The plaintiff, operator of an exclusive restaurant in the City of
Cleveland, petitioned for an injunction restraining the officers and mem-
bers of three unincorporated labor unions from picketing her place of
business. The defendants were picketing in an attempt to persuade her
to discharge her employees unless they became members of one of the
defendant unions. The plaintiff-employer ran an open shop, did not
attempt to persuade or dissuade her employees from joining any of the
defendant unions, made no inquiry as to union affiliations when hiring
employees, never discharged an employee for union activities, had no
dispute with her employees about the wages or conditions, and did not
undersell restaurants employing union help exclusively. The trial court
rendered a decree restraining all picketing, bannering, and boycotting
of plaintiff's restaurant. On review the Court of Appeals permitted
peaceful picketing and boycotting. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed
the Appellate Court decree and rendered final judgment in conformity
with the Common Pleas Court decree, Judges Zimmerman and Day
dissenting.'
The instant case is the first in which the Supreme Court of Ohio has
been faced with the determination of whether or not the picketing
union's members must be, or have been, employees of the picketed
employer in order for a trade dispute to be in existence. The Courts of
Ohio have for many years held that the right to picket peacefully is
dependent upon the existence of a trade dispute,2 but the question has
continually arisen as to exactly what that term connotes. The majority
in the instant case cite La France Electrical Construction & Supply Co.
v. I.B.E.W.,2' which held a trade dispute to exist when former employees
were seeking to secure the right to work under terms of employment
'Crosby v. Rath 136 Ohio St. 35z, Ohio Bar, March i1, 1940 (1940). The decision
in this case was rendered on the ground that there were no acts of violence.
'La France Co. v. Elec. Workers xo8 Ohio St. 6z, i4o N.E. 899 (19z3)5 Lundoff-
Bicknell Co. v. Smith 24 Ohio App. z94, x56 N.E. 243 (9Z7); Driggs Farms, Inc. v.
Milk Drivers' Union, 49 Ohio App. 303, 3 Ohio Op. 2Z (1935); z O.S.LJ. 302.
a io8 Ohio St. 6x, 14o N.E. 899 (29z3).
